The fact that the source of this power is statutory and not the prerogative is also not in point. It is now well established that the source of power is immaterial, it is the nature of it is that it is important, see the CCSO case. In my judgment Ex p Edey is indistinguishable from the present case and is binding upon us. Even though the applicant was unrepresented, the Court had the advantage of submissions from Mr Richards on behalf of the Attorney General and it cannot be said that the decision is per incuriam. I also respectfully agree with Mr Justice Popplewell's decision in ex parte Ferrante and adopt the nine propositions which are set out. The case went to the Court of Appeal, but that Court did not consider the issue of jurisdiction. I do not consider there is any distinction in principle between the statutory power in the two cases. In my judgment, the court has no jurisdiction to review the Solicitor General's decision in this case."

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the above extracts of the Judgment of Stuart-Smith L.J. The case itself related to a decision of the Solicitor General not to take proceedings for contempt of court arising out of the newspaper coverage of a criminal trial pursuant to statute. Therefore the whole tenor of the Judgment was aimed in the main at authorities under which the Attorney General exercised his power either by prerogative or statute to institute proceedings or to refrain from instituting proceedings or to deny an individuals right to take proceedings (relator actions). This is very evident in the extract from the Gouriet case in the House of Lords where viscount Dilhorne emphasised the position by including the words "these powers" so that the sentence read, "in the execution of these powers he is not subject to ..... control and supervision by the Courts" (in a relator action).

It is important to note that Stuart-Smith L.J. expressly adopted Popplewell J's nine propositions and having given those propositions my most careful consideration I am driven to the conclusion that there will be cases, albeit uncommon and perhaps undiscovered where this Court will consider examining the discretion of the Attorney General under a Petition of Doleance. I therefore rule that there is no absolute bar from this Court reviewing administrative or executive decisions of the Attorney General of the Isle of Man.