These were the propositions approved by Stuart-Smith L.J. in the Taylor case (above). We refer in particular to propositions (6) & (7) and have therefore to consider whether having regard to the nature of the particular powers in question the Attorney General is immune from suit. We have looked to the decisions in Jersey and the Isle of Man for guidance and then have reached our own conclusion. The Royal Court in Jersey in McMahon (above) appears to have taken a line which strikes us with respect as somewhat inconsistent, in that the Royal court (without at that time having the benefit of such later authorities as Ferrante or ex p. Smith) held that the Attorney General was immune, so that there was no jurisdiction over him, and yet at the very end of the judgment went on to hold that after all there was a specific and apparently limited jurisdiction to interfere. Once there is jurisdiction of any kind it is difficult to see how the Attorney General's position could be said to be one of immunity.

The Court of Appeal of the Isle of Man however had no such difficulties and with the advantage of the Ferrante decision and of the judgment of Stuart- Smith L.J. in Reg -v-Solicitor General ex. P.Taylor & Taylor (above) held that there was no absolute bar preventing the Courts in that island from reviewing administrative or executive decisions of the Attorney General of the Isle of Man. We respectfully adopt the same reason so far as concerns the island of Guernsey, adding the further factor that, whereas the Attorney General of the Isle of Man has been said (possibly inaccurately) to be answerable to Tynwald, the Procureur is answerable only to the Crown, an accountability which is in practice likely to be of little practical effect in such a matter as this.