"The principal issue between the parties is one of fact and the court starts by making the obvious point that on an appeal, there is a major difference between the proper powers of the court with regard to primary facts, that is to say, findings of primary fact by the judge of first instance where the judge of first instance has the advantage which the appeal court does not have, of having heard the parties and their supporting witnesses and to have been able to observe them giving evidence. That type of fact is to be distinguished from inferences to be drawn both from the primary facts and from documents, where, generally speaking, the appeal court is in as good a position as the judge of first instance. And thus it follows that the appeal court is entitled to draw different inferences, if it feels impelled to do so, but is not; generally speaking entitled to disagree with the primary facts found by the judge."

Having considered the findings of the judge of first instance, he contained [at 170]

"These are all findings of primary fact by His Honour and as I have said this court is not in a position to challenge those findings unless .it can be shown to our satisfaction that there is some other material not merely balancing one witness against another, but some other incontrovertible factual material which, shows that His Honour was not justified in that finding."

Mr Conti's submissions on the grounds contained in paragraph 7[1] of the Petition may be summarised thus -

[a] Mr Conti submitted that the Acting Deemster erred by concluding that "the latter part of the Minutes [of the meeting on 15th January 1998] largely reflect Mr Holmaranta's own opinions of his own position." However Mr Conti conceded that there were two possible constructions of such minutes, one of which was adopted by the Acting Deemster, and although he later categorised such conclusion as perverse, we have no doubt that this was a conclusion which Acting Deemster Corrin was entitled to reach.

[bl It seemed to us that Mr Conti's submission that the Acting Deemster failed to interpret correctly the translation of the Bankruptcy Inspector's report amounted simply to a complaint that the Acting Deemster did not give as much weight to the evidence of the Appellant as the Appellant wished. We have no doubt that the Acting Deemster Corrin was entitled to reach the conclusion which he did.