That decision effectively defeated the point of law raised by the Attorney General but Deemster Corrin was astute to appreciate that in the instant case his decision did not dispose of the underlying problem, based as it was - and is - not on the traditional powers of the Attorney General "which it has been established should not be subject to judicial review. When carrying out those functions e.g. consent to prosecutions deciding whether or not a prosecution should be taken, entering a nolle prosequi and so on, he is acting in his own right as Attorney General and those powers are of such a nature that it would be quite absurd to allow a Court to interfere with his discretion…"

However he then considered the powers of the Attorney General pursuant to Section 24 of the Act and added "…It seems to me therefore that the character of the power contained in S.24 of the Act and indeed in S.21 of the 1991 Act should properly to a limited extent be subject to judicial review by means of a Petition of Doleance".

Having considered the position in England where similar powers are exercisable by the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (albeit under the superintendence of the Attorney General) he held "…if at all possible persons subjected to the Attorney General's similar functions in the Island … should have some recourse in the absence of an appeal procedure to have the exercise of such powers examined by the Court to ensure that there has been no irregularity or non-compliance with the strict terms of the section".