The Learned First Deemster then issued a warning to the Petitioners which we repeat and endorse. "It is therefore only fair to warn the Petitioners in this case that whilst this Court will not bar them from approaching the seat of justice in order to correct and if necessary to quash the acts of the Attorney General in relation to his powers under Section 24 of the Act this Court will not act as an appellate authority but will act as a supervisory tribunal to ensure that the Attorney General complied strictly with the provisions of the statute and that he exercised his powers and functions properly and regularly".

From that decision the Attorney General appealed, still maintaining his claim to blanket immunity from judicial review.

When, however, the distinction between the Attorney General's traditional powers and those conferred on him by Tynwald pursuant to the Act were pointed out by the Court, and it was asked whether, for example, he claimed that he could exercise his powers under Section 24 with immunity from judicial review if he did not even believe that an offence had been committed (see Section 24 (1) (g) Mr Morris took instructions and told us that the Attorney General now conceded that the pre-conditions to the exercise of his discretionary powers under Section 24 were subject to judicial review by way of a Petition of Doleance. For the avoidance of doubt we make it clear that