In our view the susceptibility to review of the provisions of Section 24 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act was implicit in the Judgment of Deemster Corrin; if so we uphold that decision; if it was not so implicit then we so declare it ourselves.

The Attorney General, however, maintained that the discretionary powers conferred on him by Sections 24 (2) (3) and (10) of the Act were not subject to review.

In our view, however, not only are the pre-conditions subject to review, but so also is the discretion exercised thereafter. In our view that discretion is subject to the normal "wednesbury" rules. The Attorney General must exercise his discretion in good faith; he must take into account irrelevant ones. He must act fairly and reasonably. Provided he does so the Court will not interfere and a Petition of Doleance will not lie.

Political consideration -e.g. the nature of the regime seeking assistance, the penalties for breach of the relevant law, the nature of the law, will all be relevant considerations, and in respect of the exercise of his discretion in relation to those matters, the Attorney General will be answerable to Tynwald; only in exceptional circumstances would the Courts interfere.

Specifically in this case the Attorney General was and is dealing with frauds which Mr. Conti for the Respondents alleges